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APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE EVOLUTION
OF BROWN V BOARD OF ED UCA TION TO
OLMSTEAD: MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO
IMMEDIATE, EFFECTIVE, AND
COMPREHENSIVE INTEGRATION
Charles R. Bliss and C. Talley Wells*
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
desegregation decision.' The segregation at issue in the Olmstead v.
L.C. decision involved individuals with disabilities confined in state
institutions. 2 The Court recognized that isolating individuals with
disabilities without justification is discrimination.3 Such confinement
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.
' 4
Thus, the Court held that men and women confined in institutions had
a qualified right to be integrated.5 Unfortunately, ten years after
Olmstead, many men and women with disabilities throughout the
country remain confined in institutions.
Olmstead has frequently been compared to Brown v. Board of
Education.6 Both cases required integration of individuals who had
historically suffered discrimination. After sweeping denunciations of
the practice of discriminatory segregation, the Court in both cases
* The authors of this paper, Charles R. Bliss and C. Talley Wells, are both attorneys at the Atlanta
Legal Aid Society, Inc. Mr. Bliss is currently the Director of Advocacy. Mr. Wells is the Director of
the Mental Health and Disability Rights Project. Mr. Wells and Mr. Bliss regularly work on cases
involving the ADA and the Olmstead decision. The authors also wish to thank Peter Shelton for his
assistance with the research for this paper and David Webster and Sue Jamieson for their helpful ideas
in reviewing and editing the paper.
1. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
2. Id. at 587.
3. Id. at 600.
4. Id. at 601.
5. Id. at 607.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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confronted difficulties in devising a remedy. In both cases, the end
point, desegregation, was stated, but the practical form of the remedy
needed to most effectively produce that result was less clear. In both
cases, the remedy of desegregation involved changing huge public
systems that had evolved over many decades. Both involved public
investments in infrastructure, redeployment of public employees, and
confronting entrenched attitudes opposing the required changes. This
paper will suggest that the remedy process for desegregation of
individuals in state institutions in many ways parallels the school
desegregation process and that several lessons are available from that
process.
We begin by describing the similar issues involved in the Olmstead
and Brown cases. We then provide an overview of how the remedies
in the two cases evolved. We conclude by suggesting how lessons
from Brown can be applied to Olmstead remedies. Specifically, we
recommend that gradualism should end. Courts enforcing Olmstead
should move from requiring the development of plans with
discretionary benchmarks and waiting lists and instead require
immediate, effective and comprehensive integration of
institutionalized individuals with the supports and services they need.
I. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
DESEGREGATION OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
The similarities between desegregation of schools and
desegregation of people in institutions are striking. The difficulties of
these tasks reflect the existence of both financial and attitudinal
problems that must be overcome.
Both desegregation processes require overcoming entrenched
attitudes. In the case of school desegregation, the attitudes to be
overcome included straightforward racism. There was an expressed
belief that African-American children would not be able to compete
with white children and thus needed to be in different schools.
Prejudices also face people in institutions. Some people feel
uncomfortable with or apprehensive of them. Others believe that
people with disabilities can better or more safely be served in
[Vol. 26:3
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MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
institutions. Where people did not want African-American children in
their schools, similarly people sometimes do not want people with
disabilities living in their neighborhoods. While it may seem hard to
equate current attitudes allowing segregation of people with
disabilities to long rejected attitudes supporting racial segregation, it
is important to remember that those attitudes were once widely held.
In addition to overcoming attitudinal barriers, effective
desegregation requires a large shift of resources. In the school
desegregation context, the resource requirements were huge. African-
American children were frequently sent to substandard schools with
insufficient instructional materials. Desegregation often required
construction of new school buildings and investment in materials. In
addition, teachers had to be shifted to different locations. Student
transportation often had to be provided to effect desegregation.
Furthermore, there were people and institutions with an economic
interest in preserving the status quo of separate school systems.
Large amounts of resources must also be made available to
integrate institutionalized persons. States have built large institutions
to segregate individuals with mental health and developmental
disabilities. There often is no plausible use for these buildings when
the residents are shifted to community placements. The community
placements must often be developed as well. Personnel must be
shifted from providing institutional care to providing care in
community settings. Jobs are lost and different jobs are created to
serve people in more integrated settings. The change in required
structure and jobs is probably greater for integration of
institutionalized persons than it was for school desegregation.
Because large state institutions are the source of jobs and economic
activity in small communities, there is often a political lobby to retain
those institutions unrelated to any concern for the residents of the
institutions. However, the scale of school desegregation was so vast
that the economic resources involved were certainly larger overall.
In both Brown and Olmstead, the courts faced complex, sometimes
intractable, interests opposing significant change. The challenge of
providing the material resources to implement the required changes,
while dealing with entrenched attitudes often opposed to those
20101
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changes, made developing and monitoring the remedy following
Brown and Olmstead a complicated process.
II. EvOLUTION OF THE REMEDY IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES
This part of the paper will outline the evolution of remedy
components mandated in school desegregation cases. 7 The evolution
of the remedy occurred at different rates in different places,
depending to some extent on the willingness of local authorities to
follow the law, but common patterns emerged as the remedy
developed.
A. Brown and Brown II
Brown was decided in 1954. By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court
outlawed racial segregation in public schools. 8 While providing an
inspiring rejection of segregation, the Court was uncertain about the
appropriate remedy: "because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the
formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of
considerable complexity." 9 The Court therefore requested briefing on
the elements of relief in the Brown decision. 10
In 1955, the Court issued a second Brown decision (Brown 11) in
which it still failed to provide specific guidance for how
desegregation of schools should occur." After discussing the
difficulties that desegregation would entail, the Court stated: "[T]he
cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings
and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
7. We have looked principally at Supreme Court and Fourth and Fifth Circuit cases because that is
where the majority of cases occurred. There is a smattering of cases from other circuits.
8. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 495-96.
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
[Vol. 26:3
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MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
cases."' 12 The Court provided no timetables or requirements. The lack
of specificity of the remedy meant that the Court relied on the good
faith of the defendants and the district courts to remedy the problem
of segregation. Over the next twenty years, people throughout the
country would learn that this approach was not sufficient.
B. Courts'Attempt to Circumscribe the Scope of Relief
An initial response to the Brown decisions was an attempt by lower
courts to limit their scope and therefore circumscribe the needed
remedy. The most frequently cited limitation originated in Briggs v.
Elliott.13 The Briggs court stated:
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme
Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools
they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid
such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action.
14
This analysis conflicted with Brown's requirement that states must
"effectuate a transition to a [unitary] racially nondiscriminatory
school system."'15 Nevertheless, the Briggs analysis was adopted by
some of the circuit courts, particularly the Fourth Circuit,16 to support
remedial plans that relied on individual voluntary choice to remedy
segregation. The remedial plans focused solely on individuals rather
than class-based discrimination. These plans failed to produce
integration and instead resulted in continued segregation.
12. Id. at 301.
13. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
14. Id. at 777.
15. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
16. Sch. Bd. of City of Charlottesville, Va. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1956); Bradley v. Sch.
Bd. of City of Richmond, Va., 345 F.2d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 1965); Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 47 (5th
Cir. 1960).
20101
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C. Courts Protective of School Boards'Discretion
The Supreme Court made clear in Brown II that the method for
implementing the desegregation mandate would be determined
locally. 17 For a period of time, the courts protected that local
discretion. Even when cases came to the courts with schools
completely segregated, the remedy was to order the school board to
come up with a plan for desegregation:
The primary responsibility rests on the County Board of Public
Instruction to make 'a prompt and reasonable start,' and then
proceed to 'a good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
date' with the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court.
'During this period of transition,' the district court must retain
jurisdiction to ascertain and to require good faith compliance.' 8
Indeed, courts reversed district court orders with specific
requirements for desegregation that eliminated local discretion.' 9 The
courts also left in place procedures that were set up for the purpose of
discrimination until local schools demonstrated they actually would
use them to discriminate. 20 Courts allowed schools to discriminatorily
assign students and then required the plaintiffs to exhaust local
administrative remedies to request desegregated assignments based
21on state pupil enrollment laws. Courts gave defendants every
benefit of the doubt to demonstrate their good faith progress toward
desegregation. The most positive step under this approach was that
the appellate courts did generally require that the district courts retain
jurisdiction over the cases so that they could promptly address future
issues.
17. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299.
18. Holland v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 258 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1958).
19. Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1957).
20. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956).
21. Id.; Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780, 781-83 (4th Cir. 1959) (citing Carson, 238 F.2d at
728).
[Vol. 26:3
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MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
D. Courts Make Clear There Will Be No Going Back
Shortly after desegregation began, the Supreme Court at least made
clear that there was to be no backsliding once relief was ordered.22 In
Little Rock, Arkansas, the school board formulated a desegregation
plan in response to the original Brown order. The district court and
court of appeals approved the plan despite challenges by the
plaintiffs. When the plan was implemented in Little Rock, riots
necessitating the intervention of the National Guard occurred, and
subsequently the entire school year was disrupted. In response, the
local board proposed to curtail its plan for two-and-a-half years. The
district court approved, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.
The Supreme Court held that local opposition to integration,
including violent and disruptive opposition, would not be a basis for
delaying previously ordered and effectuated relief.23 The Court
stated, "Thus law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving
the Negro children of their constitutional rights." 24 The Court made
clear that hostility and lawless opposition were not going to defeat
court-ordered desegregation.
25
E. Courts Allow Facially Adequate Remedies That Do Not Achieve
Desegregation
Allowing local governments unguided discretion was ineffective in
attaining desegregation. In the next round of remedy development,
the defendants were at least required to come up with plans.
Unfortunately, the courts allowed plans that might have appeared
facially nondiscriminatory but produced little or no desegregation.
Examples of such plans were freedom of choice plans that allowed all
pupils to select the school they attended (often after assigning them to
schools based on race),26 plans where students were assigned
22. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965) (freedom of choice plan with discriminatory
initial assignment allowed).
2010]
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geographically but could transfer if they were in the minority at their
school,27 and plans where the county closed all schools but set up a
program which provided vouchers to private (segregated) schools.28
A principal conceptual failure in these remedies is that they focused
on individual rather than group-oriented relief to remedy a group
problem. These plans relied on the individual choices of black and
white students to attain integration. These plans were generally
insufficient because of the frequent threats and intimidation toward
black students seeking to integrate schools. While these plans
sometimes resulted in token integration, none of these plans resulted
in significant desegregation and each left separate school systems for
minorities and whites.
F. Plans Not Achieving Desegregation Are Rejected
As the ten-year anniversary of Brown approached, there had been
little progress in desegregating many of the school districts of the
South. Cases in the courts repeatedly noted that they were still
dealing with segregated systems:
'To summarize, it graphically appears from the testimony of Dr.
Theo R. Wright, Superintendent of Birmingham Public Schools,
that he and the Birmingham Board of Education have operated a
segregated school system based upon race in the past, are doing
so now, and have formulated no plans to discontinue such an
operation. 29
In the face of this failure to achieve desegregation, the Supreme
Court mandated a change in approach to remedies. The Court struck
down plans that were not effectively eliminating segregation. The
Court struck down a plan approved by the Sixth Circuit that assigned
27. Kelley v. Bd. of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1959).
28. Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963) (abstaining from deciding whether
county could close all schools and provide funding for white private schools), rev'd by Griffin v. County
Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
29. Armstrong v. Bd. of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting Armstrong v. Bd. of
Educ., 220 F. Supp. 217 (1963)).
[Vol. 26:3
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MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
students to their local school without regard to race but allowed
students in the minority at the school to transfer. 30 A key basis for the
decision was that the plan tended to perpetuate segregation rather
than end it.31 Next the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's abstention
from deciding whether a Virginia county could shut down its public
school system entirely and fund private schools through vouchers.
The Court stated that the district court needed to devise a remedy to
"put an end to the racial discrimination practiced against these
petitioners under authority of the Virginia laws."32 The Court made
clear that the district court had broad power available to it to
eliminate discrimination, including the power to compel taxation. 33 In
these cases the Court instructed the lower courts to focus on whether
the remedy was effective in eliminating the identified wrong of
segregation, not on whether the remedy might sound like it was
constitutionally adequate. The Court also made clear that the time to
act was upon the courts: "There has been entirely too much
deliberation and not enough speed . ,,34 Despite the strong
language that the time to act was now and the broad endorsement of
district court power, the Court still did not mandate any particular
remedy. It did, however, make clear that further remedies would be
measured by their actual effectiveness and not by whether they might
plausibly remedy the problem.
35
G. Courts Mandate Gradual Remedies Requiring Actual
Desegregation
After years of frustration with desegregation efforts, courts finally
began to mandate actual desegregation. The courts no longer allowed
plans that might effect desegregation-they simply ordered that
actual desegregation take place. This often took the form of ordering
that children attend schools based on where they lived and that those
30. Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 684 (1963).
31. Id. at 686.
32. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964).
33. Id. at 233.
34. Id. at 229.
35. See id. at 233-34.
20101
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schools be desegregated. However, the courts still allowed a gradual
process of desegregation. Many of these plans required a grade per
year to be integrated.36 These plans were in some cases mandated by
the court of appeals to district courts that refused to enter injunctions
ordering desegregation.
37
Within a year or two after the courts began regularly mandating
grade per year desegregation plans, the courts stepped up the pace of
required desegregation. The Fifth Circuit required desegregation to
occur both from the twelfth grade down and from the first grade up,
and often at the rate of more than one grade per year at both ends.38
As the court succinctly put it, "the rule has become: the later the start,
the shorter the time allowed for transition."39 Once meaningful
desegregation was mandated, it seemed harder for courts to justify
allowing discrimination against some children to persist while
discrimination against substantial numbers of other children was
ended.
The underpinning for the requirement of remedies producing actual
integration was a firm rejection of the idea from Briggs that "the
Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids
[segregation]. ' 4° The Fifth Circuit dismissed this limiting idea and
instead held that school districts "have the affirmative duty under the
Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated, unitary school
system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools-
just schools. ' 41 The court focused on elimination of discrimination
against the class of minority students rather than individual
students.42  Thus, it mandated remedies that would actually
desegregate the schools, although it still allowed gradual
implementation.
36. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 1962) (a grade per year going to
two grades per two years in the future); see also, e.g., Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 322 F.2d 356, 359
(5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
37. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1963).
38. See, e.g., Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1965);
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 64 (5th Cir. 1964).
39. Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1965).
40. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
41. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1967).
42. Id at 423 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:3
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H. Courts Focus on Component Aspects of Remedy
Once the courts began to require actual integration, their attention
was also drawn to other aspects of segregation that needed to be
remedied in order to have unified school systems. The Court focused
on faculty desegregation and ruled that courts must promptly deal
with that component to provide a full remedy.43 Lower courts
recognized the critical nature of integration of faculty" and looked to
"a sextet of indicia-student bodies, faculty, staff, transportation,
extracurricular activities, and facilities. '45 Implicit in the focus on
system-wide indicators was the clear recognition that while
discrimination was a violation of individual rights, it was directed at a
group:
Segregation is a group phenomenon. Although the effects of
discrimination are felt by each member of the group, any
discriminatory practice is directed against the group as a unit and
against individuals only as their connection with the group
involves the antigroup sanction.... [As] a group-wrong ... the
mode of redress must be group-wide to be adequate.46
I. Courts Mandate Immediate Desegregation
Fourteen years after the Brown decision, many schools remained
almost completely segregated. At that point, the Supreme Court
simply said that no more time was allowed for gradual remedies and
the appropriate remedy was an order for immediate desegregation.
The Court first focused on the fact that the remedy must achieve
actual integration: "In the light of the command of that case, what is
involved here is the question whether the Board has achieved the
'racially nondiscriminatory school system' Brown II held must be
43. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965).
44. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 882-84 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd on
reh 'g en banc, Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. United States, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
45. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1970).
46. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 866 (quoting Comment, The Class
Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 577 (1953)).
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effectuated in order to remedy the established unconstitutional
deficiencies of its segregated system.' ,47 The Court next made clear
that the remedy must work now: "The burden on a school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now.
'As
The immediacy requirement became even more dramatic in the
next term. The Court ordered desegregation to occur in the middle of
the school year on a few weeks' notice from the Court's order:
The Court of Appeals' order . . . is remanded to that court to
issue its decree and order, effective immediately, declaring that
each of the school districts here involved may no longer operate
a dual school system based on race or color, and directing that
they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems.a9
On January 14, 1970, the Court ordered that the schools of West
Feliciana Parish be desegregated by February 1, 1970.50 The Court
ultimately felt constrained to order desegregation, which it had
previously recognized as a complex and difficult undertaking, to
occur in a matter of weeks. Because many school systems had not
effectively desegregated, this sort of order was applied to numerous
schools districts across the South.51
J. Authorization of Further Remedies to Ensure Effective
Desegregation
Following the orders for immediate desegregation, the courts did
not stop their efforts to ensure compliance with the law. They went
on to allow further remedies to ensure that desegregation was
effective. For instance, courts mandated teacher transfers, 52 mandated
47. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968).
48. Id. at 439.
49. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam).
50. Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970) (per curiam).
51. E.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 425 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Stanley v. Darlington County
Sch. Dist., 424 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1970).
52. United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 716 2009-2010
716   I IT    ( :  
   ti l 
   .'.47  
   
 i ll   
i  realistically to work now.'.48 
 t   
 ti   f 
'  
  ls'      
   
   
    
 i t l    49 
    
   , .50  
 ,  
i  lt  
     
 ,  
     
. ti  rther   
regation 
 i t  i ,  
   
   
 rs,52  
). 
.  
  ,  
SO ) . 
. .,    
,  t   
. i t.,  .   ( t  ir. ). 
. it  t t  . t  t  .  .,  .  ,  t  i . . 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/3
MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
transportation be provided,53 and refused to let school districts split if
that furthered segregation.54 These aggressive remedies sought to
achieve desegregation by going beyond requiring all children to
attend their local schools regardless of race to affirmatively requiring
components of the system which supported segregation to be
dismantled. The Court determined that, going forward, the pernicious
effects of previous discrimination must be attacked through
aggressive remedies that went beyond mere even-handedness.
K. Summary
In reaching its decision in Brown, the Court recognized that the
importance of desegregation had to be tempered by the real and
practical difficulties of making it happen. In addition to the host of
difficulties that came with transforming a culture of racial prejudice
and discrimination were the practical issues of changing an entire
system of where children would attend school, who the teachers
would be, what buildings would be used, and how children would get
to school. With these realities in mind, the Supreme Court originally
ordered desegregation to occur with "all deliberate speed.",55 The
pace of change after the "all deliberate speed" order, however, was
often too slow. School systems developed plans that were ineffective
to create actual integration or that would take too long, such as
integration one grade at a time. As time went by and systems were
not changing with "all deliberate speed," or any speed, the courts
moved through a succession of intermediate remedial measures,
finally ordering school systems to desegregate completely and
immediately.
III. THE OLMSTEAD REMEDY AND ITS EVOLUTION
As in Brown, the Court in Olmstead recognized the desegregation
of institutionalized persons would be complicated by the need to
53. Brewer v. Sch. Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1972).
54. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown fl), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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develop alternative placements and overcome entrenched attitudes
and interests.56 The Court recognized there must be a balancing
between placement of individuals in integrated settings and the need
of the states to have an orderly process.57 In a parallel to the "all
deliberate speed" requirement in Brown, the Supreme Court in
Olmstead provided a similar prescription for how the integration
mandate of Olmstead should occur. A plurality stated that states
could meet their obligation by creating a comprehensive working
plan for transitioning individuals with disabilities into the community
along with a waiting list that would move at a "reasonable pace."
58
The plurality came to this prescription by balancing the requirement
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 59 and its implementing
regulations. These regulations require that states make reasonable
modifications to existing rules, policies, and practices to carry out the
integration mandate with the state's ability under the ADA to raise a
defense that such reasonable modification would fundamentally alter
the state's system of caring for and treating the larger population of
individuals with similar disabilities.60 The Court recognized it would
take time to reach the required end state where people were provided
care in the most integrated environment possible.
6 1
Today-just as the courts following the Brown decision moved
from "all deliberate speed" to ordering desegregation immediately-
courts enforcing Olmstead should take into account the ten years that
have elapsed since the Olmstead decision and begin to move from
simply requiring plans with waiting lists to requiring immediate
integration for people with disabilities. Ten years after Olmstead,
56. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 604.
58. Id. at 606.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
60. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604.
61. Once the individuals whom all parties agree can be served in more integrated environments are
placed, there may remain a group about whom states may make the fundamental alteration argument that
they cannot be served in a community setting. Decisions on these sorts of cases have more to do with the
appropriate end point for the Olmstead remedy than evolution of the remedy to reach that endpoint, and
might be analogized to cases like Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (cannot impose cross district
desegregation remedy), where the Court began to draw substantive limits on the reach of remedies to
effect desegregation.
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states, whether or not they have actually done so, have had time to
create working plans and to draw down their waiting lists. As more
time passes from the Olmstead decision, the strength of a state's
assertion that major modifications would be fundamental alterations
diminishes.
A. The ADA
The foundation for the Olmstead decision is the ADA. When
Congress passed the ADA, it found that individuals with disabilities
had historically experienced-and continued to experience-
discrimination by confinement in institutions, segregation, and
exclusion due to lack of modifications to facilities and practices.
62
Congress passed the ADA to remedy such discrimination as well
as to promote integration and inclusion. Title II of the ADA prohibits
public entities from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities.63 Two key federal regulations help enforce this
antidiscrimination prohibition. The "integration regulation" requires
public entities to ensure that their services and activities are
"administer[ed] ... in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities. 64 The "reasonable
modification regulation" requires public entities to make reasonable
modifications to avoid discriminating based on a disability, unless a
modification would cause a fundamental alteration to the public
entity's service, program, or activity.
65
These two regulations are at the heart of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Olmstead. These regulations are also the key to
post-Olmstead court decisions determining the extent and the speed
by which desegregation and integration should occur.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (2006).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
64. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998).
65. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
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B. Olmstead v. L.C. Decision
The plaintiffs in Olmstead were two women who had diagnoses of
mental retardation and mental illness. 66 They were both confined to a
Georgia mental health institution even though their doctors and
treatment teams determined that they could live in the community.
67
The Supreme Court succinctly boiled the issue in their case down
to whether the ADA's prohibition of discrimination by a public entity
required "placement of persons with mental disabilities in community
settings rather than in institutions. ' 68 To that question, the Court
answered with a "qualified yes.,, 69 It created the following three-
prong test to explain when such action was required: (1) when
treatment professionals determine that community placement is
appropriate; (2) when the individual does not oppose being served in
the community; and (3) when the placement is a reasonable
accommodation when balanced with the needs of others with mental
disabilities.70
1. The First Prong: Whether a Community Setting Is Appropriate
The first prong in Olmstead is based on the requirement in the
integration regulation that public entities administer services in the
most integrated setting "appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities." 71 The preamble to the integration
regulation defines this setting as "a setting that enables individuals
with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest
extent possible." 72 According to the Court, a state may generally rely
on its treatment professionals to determine whether an individual
qualifies to receive services in the community.73
66. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1999).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 587.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 602 (citing 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998)) (emphasis added).
72. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,716 app. A (July 26, 1991).
73. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999). The requirement that treatment professionals be
from the state may not be necessary when Olmstead is being applied to someone who does not live in a
state institution. Cf Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 604, 610-11 (7th Cir. 2004) (using
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It is important in the analysis under this prong that the
determination be made based on the circumstances and needs of the
individual and not on whether the needed services or supports
actually exist at present in the community.74 Otherwise, if treatment
professionals limit determinations to what supports and services exist
in the community, more individuals will be found inappropriate for
services in the community and remain confined in institutions.75 In
turn, where more individuals are confined in institutions, states will
likely continue to allocate scarce resources into institutions rather
than into services in the community, which can make this a chicken
and egg problem.76 Such inertia defies the mandate that individuals
be served in the most integrated setting.
Once one looks through the lens of what is possible, there are few,
if any, needs of individuals with disabilities that can only be met in
institutions.77 While cost can be raised with limited success by a
public entity for the third prong of the Olmstead test, cost should not
be a basis under the first prong for a determination of whether an
individual can benefit from a community placement with appropriate
supports.
Thus, the first prong should be a low hurdle. The question is
simply whether an individual can handle and benefit from living in
the community.78
uncontradicted evidence from the plaintiff's personal doctor, nurse, and expert witness in analyzing first
prong); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003) (restating the Olmstead
test without referring to the state in the first prong).
74. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329-30 (D. Conn. 2008).
75. See, e.g., id. at 329-30 (citing testimony that case managers did not make referrals for placement
in the community where insufficient resources existed).
76. Cf id. at 328 (discussing state commissioner's attempts to increase funding for hospital at the
same time that community placements were generally not being considered).
77. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80975, at
*126-96 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding virtually all individuals living in New York institution-like
group homes could be appropriately served in integrated supportive housing).
78. Radaszewski, 383 F.3d at 612 (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601-02) ("By no means is Eric an
'unqualified' disabled person in the sense that Olmstead emphasized-he is not someone who is 'unable
to handle or benefit from community settings .... ').
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2. The Second Prong: Whether the Individual Opposes a
Community Setting
The second prong of Olmstead is another low hurdle. It raises the
question of whether the individual opposes being served outside of
the institution. The second prong implies that an individual should be
given the option of living in the community whether or not a request
to live in a community setting is actually made. According to one
court, "[t]he Supreme Court's reasoning in Olmstead makes it clear
that a state must do more than wait until the residents of its facilities
have affirmatively asked to be placed in the state's integrated
residential settings . . . ."79 It is, therefore, incumbent on states to
inform individuals, using communication methods that meet the
individual's needs, about what is or can be available in the
community, so the individual can make an informed decision on
whether he or she opposes receiving services in the community.
3. The Third Prong: Reasonable Modification vs. Fundamental
A Iteration
The third prong of the Olmstead test has been the focus of post-
Olmstead litigation. It is also key to determining the extent and
timing of any remedy. Thus, it should be the battleground for any
future effort to move Olmstead remedies from a deliberative process
with plans and waiting lists to a mandate for immediate systemic
desegregation and integration.
In creating the third factor, the plurality cited the reasonable
modification regulation to acknowledge that a state may resist some
modifications if the modifications would fundamentally alter
services. The plurality stated:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the
reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the State to
show that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate
relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the
79. Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
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responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment
of a large and diverse population of persons with mental
disabilities.8°
As in Brown, the Court recognized the propriety of relief, but
found that "immediate" relief might be inequitable. 81 As in Brown,
there is no question that ultimately relief must be granted and it is
reasonable to assume that the equities pointing toward immediate
relief increase as time goes by.
The plurality then gave an example. It said a state could satisfy the
reasonable modification regulation if it demonstrated "that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated. 82 This
model of a working plan with reasonably moving waiting lists
became a focal point of discussion in later litigation, particularly in
class actions dealing with large systems of care. The question now is
whether the model needs to evolve to emphasize immediacy and
effectiveness after ten years of opportunity to meet the requirements
by devising plans and waiting lists.
C. The Evolution of Olmstead
The evolution of Olmstead is not as apparent as the evolution of
Brown. This is due in part to the fact that not as much time has
passed, so we do not have the benefit of a historical perspective. It is
also due in part to the fact there are simply fewer appellate cases
interpreting Olmstead.
With that caveat, there are still key ways in which Olmstead has
evolved and ways in which it needs to further evolve. Olmstead has
been expanded to include all qualified individuals with disabilities
who need institution-level services whether or not such services are
80. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) (plurality).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 605-06.
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presently being provided in an institution. Limitations have been
placed on the fundamental alteration defense, including with respect
to whether changes to Medicaid or costs will be seen as fundamental
alterations. The working plan model as a way for a state to satisfy the
fundamental alteration defense has been given a little more flesh and
has been interpreted as a requirement rather than an option. At the
same time, the Olmstead evolution continues to have one of the key
drawbacks of the early Brown evolution in that courts still generally
require the states to be the key actors in creating and timing the
Olmstead remedy.
1. Expansion to All Qualified Individuals Needing Institution-
Level Services
While the Olnstead decision involved women confined to a
psychiatric hospital, the Olmstead decision has been interpreted to
apply to all individuals with disabilities who need institution-level
services. 83 It applies to individuals in nursing facilities, 84 to
individuals in large congregate settings akin to institutions,85 and to
individuals with all types of disabilities, including individuals with
severe disabilities. 8
6
Olmstead also applies to individuals who currently live in the
community but who need institution-level services in order to
continue to remain in the community. 87 As one court stated, the
Olmstead protections would be meaningless if individuals "were
required to segregate themselves by entering an institution before
they could challenge an allegedly discriminatory law or policy that
threatens to force them into segregated isolation."88 Many of these
cases involve Medicaid home and community based waivers
(Medicaid waivers), which are programs in which states have been
83. Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 515, 518 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. Id.
85. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296, 298, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
86. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 343 (D. Conn. 2008).
87. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 611-14 (7th Cir. 2004); Grooms v. Maram, 563
F. Supp. 2d 840, 856 (N.D. I1. 2008); Radaszewski v. Maram, No. 01-C-9551, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24923, "40-41 (N.D. Il. Mar. 26, 2008).
88. Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).
[Vol. 26:3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 724 2009-2010
724   I SIT   ( l.  
tl    
  ,  t 
   
   
   
   
t     
  ll  
   
 
. i  l lified ls  1 ti n-
 
 m     
  t   
  l 
  ities,84  
i i i l  i  l r  r t  tti  i  t  i tit tions,85   
i i i l  it  ll t   , l   
 isa ilities. 86 
 l  tl   
it    i -l el    
 ity.87  
l t   l  l   
r ir  t  r t  t l   t i   i tit ti   
   l  t r    
  l tion.,,88  
  i  it    
i i  i ,    
 , .  
[d. 
. i ilit  t , . . tt ,  .  . . .  
.  .  .,  
. , . ., i .    
. .  ,  ( . . lll. ); i . r , . 1,  . . .  
, * -  ( . . III. . ,20 . 
. i  . l . lt   .,  .  ,  . 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss3/3
MOVING FROM GRADUALISM TO INTEGRATION
given waivers by the federal Medicaid agency to provide institution-
level services in the community rather than in institutions.
89
2. States May Be Required to Seek and Maintain Medicaid
Waivers
A requirement that a state seek an amendment through the federal
government of its Medicaid waiver program in order to provide a
reasonable modification may not in itself constitute a fundamental
alteration. 90 In an Illinois case, a man with a severe disability, who
required the assistance of a ventilator, needed care at a higher cost
and at a higher "level of care" than the state provided through its
adult Medicaid waiver, even though he had received such care under
the state's waiver for children. 91 He could only receive the medical
services he needed in an institution through Medicaid. 92 The state
argued that it could not provide a higher level of care or at a higher
cost cap because its approved application with the federal
government for the Medicaid waiver did not allow for such care.
93
The court held that requiring the state to modify its waiver through an
application for such a change with the federal government would not
be a fundamental alteration, especially where there was no evidence
that the cost of care would be higher if the services were provided in
the home as opposed to in an institution.
94
The inverse is also true for Medicaid waivers. A state may be
restricted from amending a Medicaid waiver in a way that would
hinder integration, such as reducing the care it provides under the
waiver in a way that would force individuals to receive care in an
institution.95 As in the school cases, it appears that courts enforcing
89. See, e.g., ARC of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2005).
90. Grooms, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 856; Radaszewski, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *40-41 (stating that
Illinois could modify the waiver from the federal government without fundamentally altering the nature
of services and programs). But see Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999).
91. Grooms, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
92. See Grooms v. Maram, 563 F. Supp. 2d 840, 856-57 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 857-59.
95. See Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Olmstead will be attentive to avoid backsliding once integration has
been funded.
3. Significant Costs Are Not a Fundamental Alteration
A state cannot succeed on a fundamental alteration defense simply
by showing that the remedy sought would involve painful costs. The
Tenth Circuit rejected the idea that Oklahoma could limit how many
medically necessary prescriptions it provided under a Medicaid
waiver solely because it was undergoing a fiscal crisis. 96 Congress
was aware, it noted, that integration of individuals with disabilities
would involve substantial short-term financial and administrative
burdens. 9
7
4. Exhaustion of Remedies Not Required
As in the school cases, defendants have attempted to derail
Olmstead enforcement by invoking exhaustion of remedies theories.
A recent case rejected a requirement that institutionalized applicants
be approved for more integrated "supportive housing" when there
was no assistance with such applications. 98 The court also rejected an
argument that it was necessary for the applicants' treatment providers
to find them eligible for more integrated services. 99 The court refused
to let bureaucratic impediments stand in the way of effective relief.
This parallels the initial acceptance and eventual rejection of this sort
of exhaustion of administrative remedies stratagem in the school
desegregation cases.
96. Id. atI 182-83.
97. Id. at 1183 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 473).
98. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80975, at *216
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9. 2009).
99. Id. at *219-20.
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5. Frederick L. Decisions: Plans Necessary for the Fundamental
Alteration Defense
In Olmstead, the Supreme Court suggested that a state might be
able to satisfy the fundamental alteration defense if it had a working
plan for moving individuals out of an institution with a reasonably
moving waiting list.100 The seminal cases fleshing out the "working
plan" model were the two Frederick L. cases decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The cases involved
Olmstead claims of a class of individuals who were in a large
congregate psychiatric hospital in Pennsylvania and who wished to
be placed in community settings. 101
In Frederick L. I, the court acknowledged that Pennsylvania had
made progress in the past in moving individuals out of institutions,
but it rejected any assumption that past progress equated to a future
commitment. 102 What the state needed for the court to accept its
fundamental alteration defense was a plan for community
placement. 0 3 General policies and procedures for discharge planning
did not constitute an Olmstead plan. 0 4 Although it found the state did
not have a plan, the court rejected the plaintiffs' request that the
Department of Public Welfare be ordered to provide sixty community
residential slots per year.'0 5 It specifically rejected plaintiffs'
argument that the Department should be required to favor additional
community placements in its allocation of resources over other
budget items by stating the judiciary is not well equipped to oversee
internal budget decisions of the Department. 10 6 In the end, the court
simply required the state to provide "a plan that is communicated in
some manner" for moving qualified individuals with disabilities into
less restrictive settings and a "commitment to action in a manner for
100. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,605-06 (1999).
101. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. fl), 422 F.3d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2005);
Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 1), 364 F.3d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 2004).
102. FrederickL. 1, 364 F.3d at 500-01.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 500.
105. Id.
106. FrederickL. , 364 F.3d at 497-98 (3d Cir. 2004).
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which it can be held accountable by the courts.'' 107 This is
comparable to remedies in the school desegregation context requiring
school districts to come up with desegregation plans.
After remand, the Department provided submissions to the district
court in its attempt to comply with the Third Circuit's decision.'
0 8
The case was again appealed to the circuit court, which rebuked the
department's post-remand submissions as a "vague assurance" that
individuals would be moved out of institutions and into the
community. 10 9 The court specifically held that a "comprehensive
working plan" was necessary for a successful fundamental alteration
defense." 0 While it acknowledged that the judiciary is not well suited
to devise a plan for community placement, it stated it would offer
judicial guidance because of concern about discrimination and the
rights of the individuals in the hospital.'' To comply with Olmstead,
it said:
A viable integration plan at a bare minimum should specify the
time-frame or target date for patient discharge, the approximate
number of patients to be discharged each time period, the
eligibility for discharge, and a general description of the
collaboration required between the local authorities and the
housing, transportation, care, and education agencies to
effectuate integration into the community.' 1
2
The requirement of measurable goals is another step in evolution
of the Olmstead remedy. Measurable goals provide that there be
actual progress toward community integration and provide a basis for
plaintiffs to promptly return to court if suitable progress is not made.
In contrast to the Frederick L. cases, some courts have found in
favor of states on their fundamental alteration defenses in cases
107. Id. at 500.
108. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. Hl), 422 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 156.
110. Id. at 157 (citing Olmstead v. L.C, 527 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1999)).
111. Id. at 160.
112. Id.
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where the states had significantly increased their allocation of
Medicaid waivers." 13 In one case, Washington had increased its
home- and community-based waiver slots from 1,227 in 1983 to
9,977 slots in 1998 and the budget for community-based disability
programs such as the waiver program doubled from 1994 to 2001.114
During that time, the population of individuals categorized as
"institutionalized" decreased by twenty percent. 1 5  In New
Hampshire, the state had increased slots in its waiver program
targeted for individuals with acquired brain disorder from 15 in 1993
to 132 slots in 2006.116 The approximate average waiting period for a
slot from the date of application was one year." 7 In these cases, the
courts did not require the states to apply for and provide the
additional Medicaid waivers sought by the plaintiffs. But the courts
recognized that the states were making substantial progress as
measured by the number of waivers they funded for community
placements. Again the accepted remedy still allowed state discretion
and delays for some individuals but also recognized the state was
making measurable progress.
D. Summary of Olmstead Remedy Evolution
Olmstead, like Brown before it, allowed a balancing of individual
rights against state necessities in crafting a remedy to alter long
standing institutional relationships. As with Brown, as time goes by,
the balance should tip evermore toward vindicating individual rights.
Ten years after the Olmstead decision, courts in some jurisdictions
have clarified requirements for ADA integration remedies. These
decisions have made clear that Olmstead applies to all placements
and that the courts will look at the possibility of more complete
integration even when the state has made some progress. Courts have
113. E.g., ARC of Wash. State, Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2005); Sanchez v.
Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005); Bryson v. Stephens, No. 99-CV-58-SM, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71775, at *25, 26 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2006); see also Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d
591 (D. Md. 2001) (finding no fundamental alteration in waiver case for similar reasons).
114. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 621 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (1999)).
115. Id.
116. Bryson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71775, at *16.
117. Id.at*18.
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also made clear that states must have plans with measurable goals
and that courts will look at whether actual progress is made in placing
people in the community. 8
E. Olmstead Relief Ten Years After the Supreme Court Decision
Should Be Immediate, Effective, and Comprehensive
As more time elapsed from the Brown decisions, courts
progressively raised the bar of what changes were required to comply
with Brown and when such changes were required. The lessons
learned in implementing Brown over time are applicable to
implementing integration called for by Olmstead. Now that ten years
have passed since Olmstead, the courts must move beyond simply
allowing plans with target dates and move toward mandating
immediate, effective, and comprehensive integration of
institutionalized individuals.
F. Courts Should Require Immediate Desegregation and Integration
Time is a critical factor when civil rights are at stake. In the school
desegregation cases, each year that passed without integration meant
a young child would be educated for an entire grade in a segregated
setting. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "Ordinarily, on a declaration by a
court of unconstitutional deprivation of rights, the relief granted is
immediate and complete. But that is not the process encompassed in
the 'all deliberate speed' concept of [Brown I/]."" 9  This
"moratorium" of civil rights caused great anxiety in the judiciary
because it ran counter to the American "notions of ordered
liberty."' 120 For a time, though, it was tolerated due to the magnitude
of transforming school systems and concerns over the judiciary
inserting itself into school administration. 12 1 Ultimately, though, the
118. See supra notes 102-103, 107 and accompanying text.
119. Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1962) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955)).
120. Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1965).
121. Ross, 312 F.2d at 195; Price, 348 F.2d at 1013-14.
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courts turned back toward immediate and complete relief in order to
ensure the fundamental liberties at issue.
122
Similar to Brown, each year that passes in which a state is allowed
to segregate an individual in an institution is a year in which the
individual suffers the discrimination prohibited by the ADA.123 It is a
year without privacy, without freedom of movement, and without an
easy ability to interact with the larger world. It is a year of human
potential degraded and lost. While similar concerns exist over the
magnitude of change necessary to ensure integration and the role of
the judiciary in administering systems for providing services to
individuals with disabilities, ultimately these concerns must give way
to the fundamental liberty interests of the individuals suffering
discrimination and lack of integration.
The post-Brown cases can be a significant guide for courts to use
in moving toward requiring immediate desegregation and integration
under Olmstead. Near the tenth anniversary of the first Brown
decision, the Fifth Circuit became intolerant of delay and found that
the later school systems started to comply with Brown, the less time
they should be given to carry it out.
124
A growing intolerance for the status quo fits well with the
evolution of the ADA, Olmstead, and Frederick L. II. In 1990, the
ADA prohibited public entities from discriminating against
individuals with disabilities and stated that discrimination included
segregation in institutions. 125 In 1999, the Supreme Court stated in
Olmstead that states could comply with the ADA by creating working
plans with reasonably moving waiting lists to provide services in the
community rather than in institutions. 126 In 2005, the Third Circuit
made clear that Olmstead and the ADA required at a minimum a
comprehensive working plan with target dates for discharges,
eligibility criteria, and a general description of the collaboration that
122. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19,20 (1969).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5), and § 12132 (2006).
124. See, e.g., Lockett v. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1965); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham
County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 65 (5th Cir. 1964).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
126. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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would take place with community providers. 127 Now, nearly twenty
years after the ADA and ten years after Olmstead, there should be
little to no tolerance for the segregation of individuals who want and
are able to live in the community with appropriate supports.
There is no question that there are substantial political and
economic difficulties with a state transitioning from an institution-
based system of services to a community-based system. Employees
face the loss of jobs and communities face the loss of significant
economic resources when an institution is closed or scaled back.
Services in the community, including medical, housing, supports, and
transportation, must be created or expanded and funded. State and
local systems of administering and providing services must be
changed. Individuals and families must be educated about the
services in the community available to them. Such changes can take
time to be done well.
But states have had since 1999 to make these changes. Just as
school boards were told in 1965 that they should have foreseen the
nettlesome problems that would arise from delaying school
integration after they were required to do so in 1954,128 states should
have foreseen the problems that would arise if they did not begin
integrating individuals who were segregated in institutions. The
Supreme Court declared in Olmstead that "unjustified isolation" was
"properly regarded as discrimination." 129 Fundamental American
ideals demand that discrimination not be allowed to persist
indefinitely.
Turning now to how this timing fits within the third prong of
Olmstead, the Supreme Court explained that a state could raise a
fundamental alteration defense if it would be inequitable for an
individual to be given relief immediately based upon the allocation of
resources and the state's obligation to serve a diverse population of
individuals with disabilities. 130 In the decade since Olmstead, states
have had substantial time to reallocate resources to provide
127. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (FrederickL. 11), 422 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 2005).
128. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1965).
129. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999).
130. Jd. at 604.
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community services instead of segregated institutional care. Thus, in
examining relief requested under Olmstead, the question should no
longer be whether the immediate relief requested is inequitable but,
instead, whether the relief, which the state has had at least ten years
to develop, is inequitable. In other words, granting relief to
individuals asserting their established right to integration was never
intended to be subjected to unreasonable delay. After ten years, any
delay beyond the details of transition is unreasonable. Considered in
this light, the fundamental alteration component of the third prong
often should be a nonissue in determining whether immediate relief
should be required. A primary lesson of Brown is that intransigent
defendants will continue to deny individual rights until the courts step
in and mandate effective relief.
G. Olmstead Relief Should Be Effective
The "viable integration plan" requirement in Frederick L. II, which
is modeled after the Olmstead example of a working plan with
reasonably paced waiting lists, has positive elements in that it
requires a state to create a plan with benchmarks for discharges with
eligibility standards.' 31 However, it has an enormous drawback in
that it gives the state too much discretion. In other words, it gives the
party that has expended resources to fight an Olmstead lawsuit, that
has denied noncompliance, and that has been dragging its feet the
responsibility to create a compliance plan and the responsibility to
carry out compliance.
This was a problem also faced by courts after the Brown decision.
The Fifth Circuit noted that there would be a need to "avoid the
temptation to recalcitrant or reluctant school systems to seek judicial
approval of a token plan . ,,132 At the same time, though, it noted
that a school board's good faith desire to do what the law requires
could have a significant impact on the fashioning of relief, but not on
the speed of the plan. 133 As time went by, the discretion allowed
131. FrederickL. 11, 422 F.3d at 160.
132. Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1965).
133. Id. at 1014.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 733 2009-2010
)   IS   733 
it   t  l  
 t  t d,    
 i t      
,  t s 
.  
  
 le  
  .   
t l    
i i    ief 
   
 
t  . 
 
   t erick . ,  
t    
  
   
l l    
   
  t   
,   
     
  
    
  
 t   
l ... ,13  
'   
    ,  
    
. erick . ,    
.  .  . . i t. . .,  .  ,  ( t  ir. ). 
. d.  . 
29
Bliss: Applying Lessons from the Evolution of Brown v. Board of Educatio
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
school districts to delay or circumscribe integration was increasingly
limited and finally eliminated altogether.
Similarly, courts must take steps to ensure that Olmstead relief be
planned and implemented in an effective manner. It is not simply
enough to discharge individuals from institutions and close
institutions. Individuals who require services at an institution-level of
care will require quality services and supports in the community in
order to be able to live full lives in the community and in order to
avoid having to return to the institution.
There are a number of lessons from the post-Brown cases that
courts can use in ensuring effective Olmstead relief. In crafting relief,
courts should require states to work with experts and national
agencies with knowledge in the field. 134 States with entrenched
systems of providing services to individuals in institutions may lack
expertise in providing quality comprehensive community services.
Other states and agencies have this expertise and should be called
upon to share their knowledge of best practices.
Courts should require results rather than simply relying on plans.
School systems tried to satisfy Brown by creating "freedom of
choice" plans, but these plans were ultimately found not to meet
constitutional standards if they did not result in integration of
students and faculty. 3
5
Courts should keep cases open and maintain jurisdiction to ensure
that quality desegregation and integration take place. 136 Regular
reports of progress should be given to the court to show that progress
is being made. 137 While courts should expect their orders to be
followed and contempt actions are available when court orders are
not followed, the systemic changes necessary to transform institution-
based services to community-based services will often require court
oversight to ensure prompt and full compliance.
134. Cf United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 838, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1969)
(requiring district court to collaborate with the experts of the federal Office of Health, Education, and
Welfare in the preparation of a plan).
135. Id. at 840-41 (quoting Adams v. Matthews, 403 F.2d 181, 188 (5th Cir. 1968)).
136. See, e.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 66 (5th Cir. 1964);
Choctaw County, 417 F.2d at 842-43.
137. See, e.g., Choctaw County, 417 F.2d at 842.
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Courts may have to require states to take dramatic and drastic steps
to ensure desegregation and integration. For instance, in the school
cases, courts mandated teacher transfers,1 38 mandated transportation
be provided, 139 refused to let school districts split if that furthered
segregation, 14° and required desegregation to take effect in two weeks
in early 1970.141 These requirements caused hardship for children and
families, cut into school budgets, and disquieted communities. Yet,
these remedies were essential to root out the vestiges of
discrimination and segregation.
Many believe that nursing facilities and mental health institutions
are necessary to serve individuals with significant physical and
intellectual disabilities or mental health disorders. Yet, the reality is
most individuals can be served in the community if the services
needed are available for them. Just as Brown completely changed the
paradigm of where students would be educated, Olmstead can change
where individuals receive supports and services. This may require
substantial short-term allocations of resources and discomfort, but it
will result in realization of the ADA's vision for the inclusion in
society of individuals with disabilities.
H. Olmstead Relief Should Be Comprehensive
The key recognition in ensuring comprehensive relief is that while
rights are individual, remedies for group-based discrimination must
be oriented toward the group. 142 The state must facilitate integration;
otherwise, segregation will inevitably persist. The early freedom of
choice remedies following Brown were ineffective because they
placed the burden on individuals to come forward and initiate
desegregation, often in the face of threats and intimidation. While
many brave and energetic parents and students did so, other parents
and students were deterred by inertia, the difficulty of pursuing relief
individually, and threats of retaliation. Most individuals who are
138. Id.
139. Brewer v. Sch. Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1972).
140. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 452-53 (1972).
141. Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290,291 (1970).
142. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 (5th Cir. 1966).
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discriminated against will not come to court to protect their rights or
even take affirmative steps to grasp their rights.
Under Olmstead, to be effective, desegregation must be initiated
by the state, not by each individual with a disability. People with
disabilities in state institutions can be very vulnerable. Sometimes
life-sustaining care is provided by the state, and it may be an
intimidating prospect to demand that the state provide non-
institutional care. People with disabilities must be considered for and
offered community supports and services as a matter of course. The
burden cannot be placed on them to demand community placements,
or desegregation will never be fully achieved. This does not mean
that individuals with disabilities cannot choose where they live, only
that choosing to live in the community with supports and services
should not be more burdensome that choosing to live in an institution.
Courts enforcing the Brown decision began requiring that all
vestiges of the dual school system be rooted out. Integration had to be
comprehensive and complete. In order to reach this goal, courts
developed the following six particulars that were necessary for
comprehensive integration under Brown: "composition of student
bod[y], faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and
facilities."' 143 Racial identification in these areas had to be eliminated
in order to end the dual school system. The end result was to be that
the whole system would be converted into "a unitary, nonracial
school system."' 144
Similarly, if the vision of the ADA and Olmstead is to be realized,
then integration must be complete to the greatest degree appropriate
to the needs of individuals. This is the requirement of the integration
regulation, and it is what is required to root out the discrimination
prohibited by Title II of the ADA. As the Courts ultimately
recognized in enforcing Brown, specific remedies concerning
components of an effective integrated system should be addressed.
The particulars necessary for comprehensive integration include: (1)
143. Ellis v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 423 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Green v. County Sch.
Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
144. Id.
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assessments of all institutionalized individuals; (2) accessible
education on community service options; (3) sufficient quality
integrated community services and supports; (4) adequate transition
services; and (5) quality controls to ensure appropriate, quality, and
sufficient community services.
First, to have comprehensive integration, every qualified individual
with a disability in an institution or nursing facility must be assessed
to determine whether such individual can live in a less restrictive
setting. While this may appear to be a large undertaking, every
nursing facility currently has specific assessments it is required to do
under federal regulation. 145 Similarly, assessments are a routine part
of treatment in mental health institutions. As the school desegregation
cases note, the responsibility for integration must be on the state, and
not on each individual. As discussed above, assessments must be
based on what community services are possible in the community
rather than simply based on what community services actually exist.
Community services are essentially modifications, which, if
reasonable, must be fashioned with the individual's needs taken into
account.
Second, individuals and, where appropriate or necessary, families
or guardians must be provided with sufficient information about what
community services exist. This requirement is similar to what is
already required by Medicaid. Medicaid requires every individual be
told about alternatives to institutional services when community
services are available. 146 Individuals must be informed using a
method that is most accessible to the individual depending on the
individual's disability. Where families or guardians are involved, the
individual's choice should be respected to the greatest degree
possible.
Third, there must be a sufficient array of quality integrated
community services and supports available to meet the needs of
individuals who are in institutions or who are at risk of
institutionalization if such individuals can live in the community with
145. See, e.g., Relationship of PASARR to Other Medicaid Processes, 42 C.F.R. § 483.108 (2009).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C), (d)(2)(C) (2006).
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necessary services. Such services will often include scattered housing
with flexible supports, vocational support, health care, medication,
personal supports, and transportation. 147 While the costs for these
services will be substantial, the Medicaid waiver programs have
shown that such services will often cost less to provide in the
community than in institutions and nursing facilities. It is also
essential that the supports and services be provided in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.1
4 8
Fourth, there must be adequate services sufficient to give
individuals, particularly individuals who have been in institutions for
years, the transitions they need to be successful in the community.
Such services will include coordination between service providers in
the institutions and service providers in the community, opportunities
for trial visits, a well thought-out person-centered transition plan, and
funding necessary to make a smooth transition.
Fifth, there must be oversight and quality controls to ensure that
individuals in the community are receiving the services they need,
that vulnerable individuals are not suffering abuse or neglect, and that
individuals are getting the services they need to live successful lives
in the community in the most integrated settings appropriate to their
needs. Court enforcement is facilitated if the court requires that
defendants keep information and provide it to plaintiffs and the court,
as was often in school desegregation cases.49
These systems requirements cannot effectively be requested by
each individual. They can only be provided by appropriate group-
oriented relief. Without this sort of comprehensive relief, each
institutionalized individual will struggle to obtain an appropriate
placement.
147. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Patterson, No. 03-CV-3209, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80975, at
*103-07 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,2009) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)).
148. Id. at *20-21.
149. E.g., United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 433 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1970).
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CONCLUSION
Both Brown and Olmstead are civil rights decisions. The premise
of Olmstead is that citizens with disabilities, who are able to live in
the community with supports, have the right to be integrated in the
community. As one court observed, it is a "gross injustice" to confine
individuals with disabilities in an institution when being in an
institution is not necessary.' Just as courts enforcing Brown
lamented the lost human opportunities from delayed implementation
of Brown, so we must acknowledge the human potential irretrievably
lost by ten years of often slow progress toward more integrated
placement of persons with disabilities. These losses cannot be
reclaimed, but courts must ensure that future losses are minimized by
requiring prompt remedial action. The ultimate lesson from
enforcement of Brown is that remedy components must evolve as
time goes by to ensure that justice is ultimately attained. Now that ten
years have passed since the Olmstead decision, courts should require
immediate, comprehensive and effective integration for all
institutionalized individuals who can live in the community with
supports.
150. Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 1), 364 F.3d 487, 500 (3d Cir. 2004).
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